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█ Abstract This work focuses on emotional concepts. We define concepts as patterns of neural activation 11 
that re-enact a given external or internal experience, for example the interoceptive experience related to 12 
fear. Concepts are mediated and expressed through words. In the following, we will use “words” to refer 13 
to word meanings, assuming that words mediate underlying concepts. Since emotional concepts and the 14 
words that mediate them are less related to the physical environment than concrete ones, at first sight 15 
they might be depicted as abstract concepts. Evidence coming from several studies shows, instead, that 16 
the issue is more complex. In this work, we will briefly outline the debate and illustrate results from recent 17 
studies on comprehension of concrete, emotional and abstract words in children and adults. We will argue 18 
that emotional words can be accounted for from a grounded perspective and will contend that emotional 19 
words represent a particular set of words that differs from both the concrete and purely abstract ones. 20 
KEYWORDS: Embodied and Grounded Cognition; Abstract Concepts; Emotional Words; Language Ac-21 
quisition; Language Processing 22 
 23 
 24 
█ Riassunto La peculiarità delle parole emotive: un approccio basato sulla grouded cognition –Questo lavoro 25 
si incentra sui concetti emotivi. Intendiamo qui per concetti i pattern di attivazioni neurali che riattivano 26 
un’esperienza interna o esterna, per esempio le esperienze interocettive collegate alla paura. I concetti so-27 
no mediati ed espressi dalle parole. Di seguito, useremo “parole” in riferimento al significato delle parole, 28 
assumendo le parole come veicolo dei concetti. I concetti emotivi e le parole che li esprimono, dal mo-29 
mento che sono meno legati all’ambiente fisico rispetto a quelli concreti, potrebbero essere a tutta prima 30 
classificati come concetti astratti. Molti studi invece mostrano come la questione sia più complessa. In 31 
questo lavoro illustreremo brevemente il dibattito e i risultati di recenti studi sulla comprensione di parole 32 
astratte, concrete ed emotive in bambini e adulti, per mostrare come una prospettiva grounded possa ren-33 
dere conto delle parole emotive, sostenendo che queste rappresentano un insieme particolare di parole, 34 
diverse sia da quelle concrete che da quelle puramente astratte.  35 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Embodied and Grounded Cognition; Concetti astratti; Parole emotive; Acquisizione del 36 
linguaggio; Processamento del linguaggio37 
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█  Emotions and embodiment 40 
 41 
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN WE HEAR, read 42 
and produce a word like “happiness”? Does 43 
the word induce in us an emotional experi-44 
ence? Do we feel happy and joyful? In this 45 
paper, we focus on emotional words starting 46 
from an embodied and grounded perspec-47 
tive, i.e. from a perspective according to 48 
which the body and the environment shape 49 
and constrain our cognitive activity.1 In line 50 
with such a view, we will argue that using a 51 
word like “happiness” implies a partial re-52 
enactment of what we have learned to be the 53 
feeling of happiness. Furthermore, we will 54 
highlight the particularity of emotional 55 
words with respect to other words such as 56 
concrete and abstract ones (e.g. “bottle” and 57 
“justice”), referring to recent data found in 58 
the literature and to recent results obtained 59 
in our lab. Compared to concrete words, ab-60 
stract words typically do not refer to a con-61 
crete, single, and specific object/entity, they 62 
are more detached from sensorimotor experi-63 
ence, and they are characterized by higher var-64 
iability both within and across subjects. Emo-65 
tional words are sometimes considered to be a 66 
kind of abstract word, as are “freedom” and 67 
“fantasy”. We will argue instead that they 68 
have a special status and differ from both con-69 
crete and from purely abstract words.  70 
The theoretical framework for our work is 71 
constituted by theories of embodied and 72 
grounded cognition, which have largely inves-73 
tigated the relation between language pro-74 
cessing and multi-modal representations and 75 
which have provided various accounts of the 76 
connection between emotions and cognition.  77 
Following this perspective, emotion pro-78 
cessing seems to be strictly related to the 79 
bodily expression of emotion itself,2 hence 80 
the role of the sensorimotor system in expe-81 
riencing emotions is crucial. The mechanism 82 
of reenactment of multimodal features is at 83 
the core of embodied theories that account 84 
for the acquisition and elaboration of emo-85 
tions and emotional language. Such theories 86 
have emphasized through experimental stud-87 
ies that both perceiving and recognizing an 88 
emotion, as well as understanding emotional 89 
language rely on embodied representations.  90 
Following the embodied interpretation, 91 
when we perceive “fear”, e.g. while looking at 92 
a barking dog, we form a simulation, in 93 
which different perception modalities co-94 
occur. Our cognitive and perceptual systems 95 
are entirely involved, starting from the visual 96 
processes that register and impress on our 97 
retina the aspect of the dog, its shape and 98 
color for example, continuing through the 99 
auditory system that perceives the dog bark-100 
ing, and ending with what is typically called 101 
the emotion of fear, i.e. the sensation of be-102 
ing scared by something, which can result in 103 
the physiological phenomena of accelerated 104 
heart beating and sweating. When thinking 105 
about fear, all the past experiences that we 106 
have collected and conceptualized as “fear” 107 
are reactivated, through the re-enactment of 108 
all the perceptual and multi-sensory features 109 
that were involved in those experiences. In 110 
this sense, theories of embodied and ground-111 
ed cognition on language processing and ac-112 
quisition are clearly denying the idea of uni-113 
versal concepts, and underscoring the im-114 
portance of the cultural and environmental 115 
context in the shaping and formation of con-116 
cepts through the re-enactment of experienc-117 
es. The idea of simulation assumes a power-118 
ful explanatory strength in theories of em-119 
bodied cognition, and it accounts for a lot of 120 
phenomena – for example, it underlies both 121 
the experience of emotions and the experi-122 
ence of using words that refer to emotions 123 
such as “love”, “fear” and “anger”. Obviously, 124 
simulating is not acting, since it implies some 125 
form of inhibition at some level, even if our 126 
neural system is activated so as to react to the 127 
emotion itself. Simulation is thought to be at 128 
the basis of situated conceptualization, and is 129 
defined as the partial re-enactment of modal 130 
states acquired through experiences with the 131 
environment. This is an unconscious process, 132 
and it accounts for the mechanisms of con-133 
ceptualization that otherwise would be diffi-134 
cult to clarify in absence of a direct stimulus.3 135 
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█  Language comprehension in an embodied 136 
and grounded perspective 137 
 138 
Embodied and grounded theorists have 139 
proposed that in comprehending and pro-140 
cessing language we recruit the same mecha-141 
nisms involved in perceiving and elaborating 142 
physical information. Evidence has shown, 143 
for example, that when comprehending ac-144 
tion-based words, such as “grasping”, and 145 
words referring to concrete objects, such as 146 
“ball”, we activate the same bodily patterns 147 
that are elicited during the action of grasping 148 
and during interaction with these objects.4 149 
Hence, word processing must be grounded in 150 
the sensorimotor system through a simula-151 
tion process.  152 
While the evidence on sensorimotor 153 
grounding of action words and concrete 154 
nouns is varied and compelling, the issue of 155 
how we represent abstract and emotional 156 
words is still a problematic point for a simu-157 
lation-based theory. Consider the difference 158 
between concrete, abstract and emotional 159 
concepts. If we think about a very prototypi-160 
cal concrete concept such as “bottle”, the 161 
embodied approach can easily predict which 162 
perceptual and motor features will be re-163 
activated during the elaboration of the word 164 
referring to the concept: a multimodal repre-165 
sentation of the bottle will include the activa-166 
tion of the neural circuits underlying its 167 
shape, dimension, color and the experience 168 
of grasping it. If we think about a prototypi-169 
cal abstract concept such as “freedom”, it is 170 
clearly more difficult to predict which sen-171 
sorimotor features will be re-enacted in the 172 
processing of the related word. The case of 173 
prototypical emotional words such as “love” 174 
is more complex than that of concrete words, 175 
since the former do not possess an object as 176 
referent; in spite of this, an embodied ap-177 
proach can predict that during processing of 178 
emotional words the neural circuits and the 179 
bodily expressions subtending the corre-180 
sponding emotions will be activated. 181 
Emotional language comprehension acti-182 
vates a simulation, as shown by a number of 183 
recent studies. Moseley and collaborators5 184 
found that the passive reading of emotional 185 
words activates the same part of the premo-186 
tor cortex that is also involved in the pro-187 
cessing of face related and arm-hand related 188 
words, used generally to speak about overt 189 
actions. Notably, the same areas are also ac-190 
tivated by highly abstract related emotional 191 
words such as “spite” which are more de-192 
tached from bodily experiences than emo-193 
tional words like “scream”. The results of this 194 
study clearly provide evidence for an embod-195 
ied and grounded theory of emotions, that is 196 
also able to account for the process of ab-197 
straction implied in the learning and in the 198 
representation of a word meaning. 199 
The role of simulation in the comprehen-200 
sion of emotional language has also been ex-201 
plored in behavioral studies. Havas and col-202 
leagues6 injected botulinum toxin in the 203 
forehead of participants, to consider whether 204 
the understanding of an emotional sentence 205 
involves the simulation of its content. If 206 
reading emotion sentences activated a simu-207 
lation, the inability to involuntarily move the 208 
facial muscles due to Botox toxin should be 209 
reflected in slower response times during 210 
emotion language processing. Havas and col-211 
leagues displayed an experiment in which 212 
they presented a set of happy, sad and angry 213 
sentences to participants, both before inject-214 
ing the Botox toxin and after the injection. 215 
The results showed that the understanding of 216 
an emotional sentence, especially sad and an-217 
gry sentences, was hindered by the impair-218 
ment of the facial mimicry induced by botu-219 
linum. This was reflected in a reduction in 220 
response times when sad and angry utteranc-221 
es were processed after the injection. This 222 
finding indicates that embodied simulation 223 
can also account for the processing of emo-224 
tion-related language. 225 
 226 
█  Grounding abstraction and emotions in 227 
language: The specificity of emotional 228 
words 229 
 230 
While there is clear evidence that emotion 231 
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words activate a simulation, the debate on 232 
whether emotional words can be considered 233 
a particular kind of abstract words or not is 234 
still open. The growing scientific literature 235 
on emotional words has expanded this dis-236 
cussion, by supplying contentious evidence. 237 
According to some scholars7 emotional 238 
concepts can be considered a means for the 239 
acquisition of more abstract concepts, since 240 
they represent the first concepts acquired 241 
without the mediation of a specific and single 242 
concrete referent. Their results show, among 243 
other things, that abstract words are pro-244 
cessed faster than concrete ones; this is ex-245 
plained by the authors on the basis of the 246 
greater affective connotation of abstract 247 
words compared to concrete nouns. Emo-248 
tional valence was proved to modulate word 249 
processing: words judged to have positive or 250 
negative emotional connotation were pro-251 
cessed faster than words with an emotionally 252 
neutral meaning. Crucially, abstract words 253 
tended to be rated as highly emotionally va-254 
lenced. In a recent study, Ponari and col-255 
leagues8 asked adults to evaluate the age of 256 
acquisition of abstract and concrete words, 257 
including positive, negative and neutral emo-258 
tional words. They found that positive and 259 
negative abstract words were acquired earlier 260 
than neutral ones, and that both abstract and 261 
concrete positive words tended to be ac-262 
quired earlier than other words. In a further 263 
lexical decision task they asked children aged 264 
6 to 12 to discriminate positive, negative and 265 
neutral abstract and concrete words. Results 266 
showed that accuracy increased with age and 267 
valence interacted with age for abstract but 268 
not for concrete nouns: children aged 8-9, 269 
the age in which abstract vocabulary increas-270 
es, were more accurate with positive abstract 271 
words compared to neutral words. Overall, 272 
studies such as these insist on the idea that 273 
emotional aspects characterize all abstract 274 
concepts and that emotional words are a sub-275 
set of abstract words and concepts.  276 
Other studies have instead claimed that 277 
emotional concepts are to be considered dis-278 
tinct from  both concrete and abstract ones. 279 
In their studies, Altarriba and colleagues9 280 
have demonstrated that emotional concepts 281 
are recalled more accurately than concrete 282 
and abstract ones, and that they are rated dif-283 
ferently with respect to psycholinguistic cri-284 
teria such as concreteness, imageability and 285 
contextual availability. The results obtained 286 
by Setti and Caramelli10 using a rating and a 287 
definition production task, also suggest that 288 
the conceptual knowledge related to emo-289 
tional concepts is markedly different from 290 
that related to both concrete and abstract 291 
ones. Mazzuca and Borghi11 also compared 292 
concrete, abstract and emotional words. Par-293 
ticipants had to perform a lexical decision 294 
task followed by a word recognition task; re-295 
sponses were given by pressing a pedal while 296 
holding a key with the hand or with the 297 
mouth. In the lexical decision task response 298 
times for concrete and emotional words did 299 
not differ, while responses to abstract words 300 
were slower. The analysis on accuracy in the 301 
recognition task revealed that responses to 302 
abstract words were more accurate than 303 
those to emotive words and tended to be 304 
more accurate than those to concrete ones. 305 
The interaction between the effector in-306 
volved (hand, mouth) and the kind of word 307 
showed that recognition was facilitated by 308 
the mouth for abstract and emotive words, 309 
while facilitated by the hand for concrete 310 
words. The results of this study in both the 311 
lexical decision and the word recognition 312 
task are clearly difficult to reconcile with the 313 
view that emotional and abstract concepts 314 
are of the same kind.  315 
Crucially for a perspective that emphasiz-316 
es the role of the body in cognition, another 317 
recent study has shown that emotion related 318 
sentences are rated as associated with the 319 
mouth and with other bodily effectors. Ghio 320 
and colleagues12 asked participants to rate 321 
associations with the mouth, hand/arm or 322 
leg/foot of sentences related to mental states 323 
(e. g. “she remembers the past”), to emotions 324 
(e.g. “she shows her disappointment”) and to 325 
mathematics (e.g. “she determines the sum”). 326 
Ratings for the mouth scale indicated that 327 
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emotional sentences were significantly more 328 
associated with mouth actions than were ei-329 
ther mental states or mathematical sentenc-330 
es; ratings for the hand scale revealed that 331 
mathematical sentences and emotional sen-332 
tences were significantly more associated 333 
with hand actions than were mental state ut-334 
terances. As for the leg scale, emotional sen-335 
tences were significantly more associated 336 
with leg actions than the other two kinds of 337 
sentences. These results support the idea that 338 
emotions are more grounded in bodily states, 339 
including embodied multi-modal representa-340 
tions, than other kinds of abstract concepts 341 
(mental concepts and numbers).  342 
As highlighted by our brief overview of 343 
the literature, interpreting data on emotional 344 
words is still a controversial matter. Consid-345 
ering the complexity of the theoretical and 346 
empirical evidence about emotion related 347 
words, in our view emotional concepts repre-348 
sent a particular and intriguing case. Moving 349 
from an embodied and grounded approach, 350 
we will here contend that emotional concepts 351 
hold a special status with respect to concrete 352 
and to purely abstract ones.  353 
On the one hand the direct involvement 354 
of the body in emotional representations 355 
mediated by words could render them similar 356 
to concrete concepts, although concrete 357 
words (with some exceptions, such as con-358 
crete words referring to food) usually acti-359 
vate neural areas related to the actions per-360 
formed with manipulable objects (e.g. hand 361 
or arms), while emotional words elicit a more 362 
general bodily activation.  363 
On the other hand, there are reasons for 364 
including emotional concepts and words in 365 
the semantic domain of abstract concepts. 366 
Like abstract concepts, emotional concepts 367 
are characterized by a high intra- and inter-368 
personal variability connected to the assign-369 
ment of meaning: since they lack a single and 370 
concrete referent, they are more subject to 371 
variation across people and spaces than con-372 
crete concepts. There are other similarities 373 
between emotional and abstract concepts 374 
that can be taken into account. An important 375 
similarity concerns the fact that, like abstract 376 
words, emotional ones seem to strongly in-377 
volve not only the hand/arm but also the 378 
mouth motor system. Different mechanisms 379 
could subtend this activation of the mouth.    380 
A first mechanism might be the fact that 381 
emotions involve our body in its whole-382 
ness. A second might be the activation of lin-383 
guistically conveyed information. This 384 
mechanism, which in our view is highly criti-385 
cal for abstract words, is not so crucial for 386 
emotional words, but might play some role 387 
especially for more abstract emotional terms. 388 
Even though basic emotional words like “an-389 
ger” and “fear” activate a clear bodily pat-390 
tern, suggesting that they are experienced 391 
and stored in conceptual knowledge as com-392 
plex and multiple representations, other 393 
kinds of emotional words are indeed more 394 
abstract and not so clearly bounded. For 395 
these concepts, similarly to what happens 396 
with abstract words13 the mouth activation 397 
could be due to the activation of linguistically 398 
conveyed information, contributing to shape 399 
and delimit the meaning of some emotional 400 
concepts. Consider for example a term like 401 
“love” and how language contributes to con-402 
textualizing its meaning. It is reasonable to 403 
think that a child’s first experience with 404 
“love”, whatever it might be – i.e. the love of 405 
her/his parents – is considerably different 406 
from her/his subsequent experiences with 407 
that feeling. With increased experience and 408 
linguistic competence, the child will presum-409 
ably learn that the feeling that relates to 410 
her/his parents, or the affection for her/his 411 
dog, are all occurrences that can be collected 412 
under the linguistic label of “love”, even 413 
though they have different hues. The word 414 
helps to collect and put together different 415 
representations of “love”. In that view, we can 416 
consider the relationship between language 417 
and simulation as a bidirectional one, viz. a 418 
relation in which both terms are mutually in-419 
fluenced one by another. In any case, the im-420 
portance of language in delimiting their mean-421 
ing and their association with the mouth is not 422 
sufficient to completely embrace a vision of 423 
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emotional terms as a subset of abstract ones. 424 
Certainly, language may play a role in the con-425 
ceptualization of emotional words, by provid-426 
ing a frame in which to ground all the emo-427 
tional experiences, but the activation of the 428 
mouth effector can have other implications, 429 
for example it could be a consequence of more 430 
general bodily activation.  431 
In sum: we propose to reconsider the rela-432 
tion between concrete and abstract concepts, 433 
not as a dichotomy, but as a continuum, in 434 
which concepts are organized and represent-435 
ed at a different level of abstractness, and in 436 
which emotion concepts represent a particu-437 
lar kind of concept. In line with the sugges-438 
tion of the Words as Social Tools proposal,14 439 
multimodal representations are involved 440 
both in the comprehension of a concrete 441 
term, and in the comprehension of an ab-442 
stract one. Words should be considered as 443 
social tools, that is, as having a performative 444 
aspect, as being useful tools to use in order to 445 
operate distinctions in the environment, and 446 
to cooperate in society.15 According to this 447 
proposal, linguistic explanations provided by 448 
competent speakers could be the basis for the 449 
acquisition of abstract meanings, helping to 450 
glue the linguistic label to the experience. If 451 
concrete words mostly activate the sen-452 
sorimotor system while abstract words also 453 
rely heavily on linguistic and social experi-454 
ence, what happens with emotional words? 455 
We propose that emotional words first of all 456 
activate an embodied simulation, leading to a 457 
re-enactment of the original emotional expe-458 
rience. However, social and linguistically 459 
conveyed information can also contribute to 460 
shaping emotion concepts, especially more 461 
complex and sophisticated emotions like 462 
“shame”. As the studies mentioned in the 463 
previous sections show, emotional words and 464 
sentences seem to activate both the hand and 465 
arm areas and the mouth; the mouth activa-466 
tion can be either a byproduct of the whole 467 
bodily activation or can be due to the activa-468 
tion of the linguistic system. In conclusion, 469 
emotional terms seem to be an intermediate 470 
level between concrete and abstract ones, 471 
sharing properties of both, but at the same 472 
time maintaining a peculiar status, and being 473 
irreducible to either of these categories. In 474 
the next section we will report recent evi-475 
dence supporting this view. 476 
 477 
█  Concrete, abstract and emotion words: 478 
Some empirical results 479 
 480 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, 481 
the debate on whether emotion words can be 482 
considered a subset of abstract words or not 483 
is far from being settled. We will now briefly 484 
report some recent results on word acquisi-485 
tion and word processing we have obtained 486 
which contrast the three kinds of words.  487 
In line with the scientific literature that 488 
has outlined the relation between abstract 489 
and emotional words and the activation or 490 
the engagement of the mouth effector, we 491 
predicted that linguistic information togeth-492 
er with experiential and sensorimotor infor-493 
mation, is at the basis of the acquisition of 494 
abstract and emotional concepts. In our view, 495 
if linguistic and social input can be consid-496 
ered crucial for assessing memories of ab-497 
stract and emotional terms, its embodied 498 
counterpart is represented by the mouth. 499 
Numerous studies have assessed the im-500 
portance of the mouth effector for the pro-501 
cessing of abstract words;16 this could either 502 
be due to the particular way in which ab-503 
stract terms are acquired, that is strictly re-504 
lated to linguistic explanations17 which can 505 
be re-enacted during the processing of ab-506 
stract words, or due to the need for re-507 
explaining the meaning of abstract terms 508 
through a form of inner talk, given their 509 
complexity. Both of these explanations are 510 
contemplated here.  511 
As for emotional terms, it has been 512 
claimed that alterations of facial mimicry in 513 
adults imply a reduction in emotional skills, 514 
also related to emotional language pro-515 
cessing. Recent studies on the relation be-516 
tween a pacifier and emotional competence 517 
have emphasized the negative impact of the 518 
device on the development of emotional 519 
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skills,18 while the role of the pacifier on the 520 
acquisition of emotional language has not 521 
been explored.  522 
We hence investigated the possibility that 523 
a forced reduction of mouth and face move-524 
ments caused by the overuse of an oral device 525 
such as a pacifier during infancy could modu-526 
late the acquisition of abstract and emotional 527 
concepts more than that of concrete ones. 528 
We thus conducted two different studies, 529 
aimed at verifying if and how the extended 530 
use of an oral device, such as a pacifier, could 531 
impact the acquisition and consolidation in 532 
memory of abstract and emotional words in 533 
children. More importantly, we wanted to ver-534 
ify if abstract and emotional concepts differ in 535 
terms of the conceptual relations they elicit 536 
and response times they require to be pro-537 
cessed, in order to examine the different na-538 
ture of these two types of concepts. For this 539 
purpose, we tested children with different lev-540 
els of education, on two different tasks. 541 
For the first study19 we asked 7-year-old 542 
children to provide oral definitions for a set 543 
of selected abstract, emotional and concrete 544 
words. Children who participated in the re-545 
search had used a pacifier for different peri-546 
ods, on a scale from never to three years or 547 
more. The definitions provided were ana-548 
lyzed and rated using two scoring systems, 549 
the first pertaining to the accuracy of re-550 
sponses (a three- point scale in which “2” 551 
corresponded to totally correct, “1” to par-552 
tially correct and “0” to incorrect or no re-553 
sponse), the second focusing on the concep-554 
tual properties. The definitions produced 555 
were parsed in conceptual components and 556 
the different relations produced were coded 557 
by two independent researchers. The catego-558 
ries used included among others “perceptual 559 
features”, “emotion”, “experiential” (referred 560 
to direct experiences with the concept), “in-561 
teraction” and “taxonomic” (referred to the 562 
higher or lower level of a taxonomy).     563 
Results showed that abstract words are 564 
more difficult to define, producing more fre-565 
quently inaccurate definitions, compared to 566 
emotional and concrete words. As for the 567 
conceptual relations elicited by the three 568 
types of concepts, emotional and concrete 569 
words clearly differed: concrete concepts 570 
were more linked to perceptual features and 571 
to taxonomic and functional relations, while 572 
emotional concepts elicited more emotion, 573 
interactive and experiential definitions 574 
among all children. As for the relations elicit-575 
ed by abstract and emotional words, the for-576 
mer elicited a higher percentage of free asso-577 
ciations, while emotional words yielded a 578 
higher percentage of interactional and emo-579 
tional relations. Despite these differences, 580 
abstract and emotional words showed some 581 
commonality: they were both affected by the 582 
prolonged use of a pacifier, especially com-583 
pared to concrete words. This could be ex-584 
plained by the fact that abstract words and 585 
concepts rely more on linguistic information 586 
and simulation, while emotional words seem 587 
to involve more interactional and social as-588 
pects; in both cases, by the way, the static po-589 
sition of the facial and oral muscles induced 590 
by the overuse of a pacifier during social and 591 
linguistic interaction, could have played a 592 
role, causing a less accurate conceptual struc-593 
turing. We suggest two different mechanisms 594 
that can account for that phenomenon, both 595 
stressing the centrality of the mouth effector 596 
in the acquisition and elaboration of abstract 597 
and emotional language; on the one hand, it 598 
is possible that the extensive use of a pacifier 599 
might have impeded children for a long time 600 
from simulating the word meaning, and con-601 
sequently from re-enacting the linguistic ex-602 
perience connected to its acquisition, or it 603 
might have inhibited the process of re-604 
explaining the meaning through inner talk, 605 
both of which are crucial aspects for the ac-606 
quisition of abstract words. On the other 607 
hand, the pacifier could have hindered facial 608 
expressions and the social and interactional 609 
aspects connected to the development of 610 
emotional competence. One could also spec-611 
ulate that the pacifier might play the role of 612 
transitional object,20 helping the baby to dis-613 
sect reality, and to gradually acquire compe-614 
tence in understanding what is in the internal 615 
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and what is in the external world. While until 616 
age 2 this does not represent a problem, its 617 
overuse could somehow interfere with the 618 
processes connected to the acquisition of 619 
language, if we consider language as the oth-620 
er elected tool that operates distinctions be-621 
tween ourselves and the world, and thus the 622 
pacifier might also interfere with the devel-623 
opment of social and emotional processes.  624 
Overall, the results of this study suggest 625 
that emotional words cannot be assimilated 626 
under concrete nor abstract words. Like con-627 
crete words, emotional ones yield more accu-628 
rate definitions than abstract words. Like ab-629 
stract ones, the conceptual relations they elic-630 
it are influenced by the long-term use of a 631 
pacifier.  632 
In the second study,21 we intended to test 633 
whether the influence of the pacifier found in 634 
the first study is extended in time. For that 635 
reason, we asked 9 year-old children (who 636 
had presumably stopped using pacifier since 637 
when they were 3/4 year-old) to perform a 638 
categorization task. As in the previous study, 639 
children who participated had used a pacifier 640 
for different periods, on a scale from never to 641 
three years or more. Children were requested 642 
to decide if the words presented on the 643 
screen of the laptop were words that referred 644 
to animals or not. In the first case, they had 645 
to press the key 1, otherwise they had to 646 
press the key 0. Children were divided into 647 
two groups, the first performing the task 648 
with the “animal” key 1, and the second with 649 
the “animal” key 0. Non-animal words were a 650 
set of selected abstract, emotional and con-651 
crete words; response times and accuracy 652 
were recorded, in order to investigate if the 653 
overuse of a pacifier has an impact on the 654 
processing speed and accuracy of abstract, 655 
emotional and concrete words. Results 656 
showed that responses to emotional words 657 
were faster than those to concrete ones, 658 
which also tended to be faster than responses 659 
to abstract ones. As for the effect of a pacifi-660 
er, children who had used one until the age of 661 
three years (or more) responded more slowly 662 
than all the other children to abstract words. 663 
The theoretical implications of these results 664 
are quite surprising; even if the interaction 665 
between the overuse of an oral device and the 666 
acquisition and consolidation of abstract and 667 
emotional concepts still needs to be clarified, 668 
it seems plausible to assume that the pacifier 669 
has an impact on the process of acquiring 670 
language. More importantly, this is a long 671 
term influence, as demonstrated by the re-672 
sults of our last study.  673 
Overall, our results outline a complex 674 
framework, that could be interpreted as fol-675 
lows: abstract concepts, and their related 676 
words, are in general more complex to define, 677 
and are strictly bound to linguistic and social 678 
information. This is clearly underlined by the 679 
results of our first study, which shows how 680 
children that have been less in contact with 681 
the linguistic environment, due to the over-682 
use of a pacifier, are less accurate in defining 683 
abstract concepts. In line with an embodied 684 
and grounded perspective on the acquisition 685 
and development of language, impairments 686 
in accuracy related to the extensive use of the 687 
device can be ascribed to decreases in the ar-688 
ticulatory movement of the mouth. As for 689 
the conceptual features elicited by the words, 690 
emotional concepts show a distinct pattern 691 
especially if compared to concrete words, but 692 
also to abstract ones. They seem to be char-693 
acterized more by experiential and interac-694 
tional properties, while concrete words evoke 695 
more taxonomic and spatial or functional re-696 
lations. If combined with the results of the 697 
second study, the distinction between ab-698 
stract and emotional words appears to be 699 
even more relevant: in fact, emotional words 700 
were shown to be processed faster than all 701 
other kinds of words, thus emphasizing the 702 
difference between emotional and abstract 703 
concepts, with the latter always showing the 704 
slowest responses. 705 
 706 
█  Discussion and further directions 707 
 708 
Altogether, our results indicate that over-709 
all emotional and abstract concepts should be 710 
treated as distinct entities, distributed along 711 
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a continuum. The notion of continuum is 712 
here employed to outline the idea that cate-713 
gories such as those of abstract, concrete and 714 
emotional concepts differ in terms of ab-715 
stractness level, and is corroborated by em-716 
pirical findings demonstrating that people 717 
perceive some words to be more/less abstract 718 
than others. We have outlined that linguistic 719 
experience, combined with sensorimotor ex-720 
perience, is the salient feature for the acquisi-721 
tion of abstract terms in children, and in our 722 
findings emotional concepts reveal concep-723 
tual properties related to social and interac-724 
tive experience. Moreover, data on response 725 
times indicate faster responses to emotional 726 
than concrete words, although the latter usu-727 
ally exhibit faster responses compared to ab-728 
stract words. This result confirms the idea of 729 
a direct activation of all the bodily experience 730 
related to emotional terms. In our view, those 731 
findings drop a hint for considering emo-732 
tional concepts as an independent category, 733 
with its distinctive traits.  734 
Further research is needed to investigate 735 
the bodily grounding of emotional words both 736 
from a developmental and from a behavioral 737 
perspective. In addition, further studies are 738 
needed to determine if and how linguistic and 739 
social experiences can ground emotional 740 
words, as demonstrated for abstract words. In 741 
our studies, emotional terms are characterized 742 
by bodily simulations and especially interac-743 
tive and experiential features. Crucially, how-744 
ever, the words we chose did not refer to 745 
complex emotions. It is possible that complex 746 
emotional terms like “shame” are processed or 747 
acquired differently from basic emotional 748 
words like “fear”, and that the role of language 749 
in the acquisition of the former is more im-750 
portant than for the acquisition of words re-751 
ferring to basic emotions. This would be in 752 
line with the data showing that, the higher the 753 
abstractness level of emotional words, the lat-754 
er they are acquired. 755 
In any case, this explanation would also 756 
strengthen the idea of the need for a fine-757 
grained distinction in the general domain of 758 
abstraction. 759 
█  Notes 760 
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